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The Wireless Control Network: Monitoring for Malicious Behavior
Shreyas Sundaram, Miroslav Pajic, Christoforos N. Hadjicostis, Rahul Mangharam, and George J. Pappas

Abstract— We consider the problem of stabilizing a plant
with a network of resource constrained wireless nodes. In a
companion paper, we developed a protocol where each node
repeatedly transmits a linear combination of the values in its
neighborhood. For certain topologies, we showed that these
linear combinations can be designed so that the closed loop
system is stable (i.e., the wireless network itself acts as a
controller for the plant). In this paper, we design a Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) for this control scheme, which observes
the transmissions of certain nodes in the network and uses that
information to (a) recover the plant outputs (for data-logging
and diagnostic purposes) and (b) identify malicious behavior
by any of the wireless nodes in the network. We show that
if the connectivity of the network is sufficiently high, the IDS
only needs to observe a subset of the nodes in the network
in order to achieve this objective. Our approach provides a
characterization of the set of nodes that should be observed, a
systematic procedure for the IDS to use to identify the malicious
nodes and recover the outputs of the plant, and an upper bound
on the delay required to obtain the necessary information.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems are often deployed in large,
spatially distributed plants that involve numerous sensors,
actuators and internal process variables. Interconnecting the
various components of these systems has traditionally been
achieved through physical wiring, which is often difficult
to do (when the plant contains hard-to-reach or dangerous
areas), expensive, and fault-prone. However, the advent of
low-cost and reliable wireless networks promises to alleviate
many of these issues [1], [2]. With this technology, sensor
measurements of plant variables can be transmitted to controllers, data centers and plant operators without the need
for excessive wiring, thereby yielding gains in efficiency and
profitability for the operator.
The topic of control over networks (wireless or otherwise) has been intensively studied by researchers over the
past decade, leading to design procedures for controllers
that are tolerant to network imperfections such as packet
dropouts and transmission delays [3], [4], [5]. These works
typically adopt the convention of having a dedicated controller/estimator located somewhere in the network, and
study the stability of the closed loop system assuming that
the sensor-estimator and/or controller-actuator communication channels are unreliable (dropping packets with a certain
probability, for example). In the companion paper [6], we
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introduced the Wireless Control Network, a new paradigm
for control over a wireless network where the network itself
acts as the controller (instead of having a specially designated
node performing this task). Specifically, we considered a
wireless network consisting of simple nodes that are able
to exchange information only with their direct neighbors.
We devised a protocol where each node transmits, at each
time-step, a single value that is a linear combination of
the values in its neighborhood. Nodes that have access to
the outputs of the plant (i.e., those nodes that are located
near the plant sensors) include those measurements in their
updates, and the plant actuators apply a linear combination
of the transmissions of nodes that are closest to them.
This novel protocol effectively causes the wireless network
to behave as a linear system with sparsity constraints on
the system matrices (corresponding to the topology of the
network). We provided a numerical design procedure (based
on linear matrix inequalities) to determine the appropriate
linear combinations for each node to use in order to stabilize
the plant, even when packets are dropped with a (sufficiently
low) probability. As discussed in [6], this scheme has several
benefits over traditional approaches to designing networked
control systems:
•
•
•

It can explicitly incorporate very simple (computationally constrained) nodes into the design procedure.
It simplifies the transmission scheduling polices for the
network.
It can easily handle practical scenarios involving largescale plants that have multiple (geographically dispersed) sensing and actuation points.

While the stability of networked control systems under
benign packet-drop scenarios has been well studied, the need
for a rigorous theory of security in industrial control systems
has only recently started to gain attention [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11]. In domains such as chemical process industries,
aviation and critical infrastructure, attacks on the control
systems could have disastrous consequences. The report
[12] makes several key recommendations for “designing-in”
security into industrial control systems. One of the points
highlighted by the report is the need to maintain accurate
logs of the plant and controller behavior, and to analyze
the information contained in those logs in order to quickly
detect and isolate anomalies. In traditional (data) networks,
this type of monitoring is performed with an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS), which essentially raises an alarm
if the observed traffic flow in the network deviates from
expected patterns [13]. The application of IDSs to wireless
networks is a relatively new area of research [14], and the

paper [15] suggests an IDS for wireless networks in process
control industries. The design in [15] captures (at a policy
level) attacks such as jamming, flooding the network with
large numbers of packets, and corruptions in the formatting
of data transmitted by certain nodes.
A more dangerous (and difficult to detect) attack in control
networks is that of data modification, where malicious nodes
subtly change the contents of messages that they are passing
through the network, but otherwise follow the normal rules
of transmission. In this paper, we describe how to design
an IDS to detect data modification attacks in the control
scheme proposed in [6]. The IDS will be responsible for
observing the transmissions of certain nodes in the network
in order to (a) recover the outputs of the plant (e.g., for
fault-diagnosis purposes), and (b) detect and identify data
modification attacks by nodes in the network; the overall
architecture of the plant, control network and IDS is shown
in Fig. 1. We show that the wireless control scheme from
[6] allows malicious behavior to be identified by examining
the transmissions of only a subset of the nodes in the
network, provided that the network topology satisfies certain
conditions. We provide an explicit characterization of the
subset of nodes that needs to be monitored, along with
a procedure for the IDS to follow in order to extract the
required information from the transmissions of those nodes.
y[k]
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Architecture of the wireless control network with an IDS.

II. N OTATION AND BACKGROUND

ON

G RAPH T HEORY

We use ei to denote the column vector (of appropriate
size) with a 1 in its i-th position and 0’s elsewhere, and the
symbol 1 to denote the column vector (of appropriate size)
consisting of all 1’s. The symbol IN denotes the N × N
identity matrix, and A′ indicates the transpose of matrix A.
The cardinality of a set S is denoted by |S|, and for two sets
S and R, we use S \ R to denote the set of elements in S
that are not in R. The set of nonnegative integers is denoted
by N.
A graph is an ordered pair G = {V, E}, where V =
{v1 , v2 , . . . , vN } is a set of vertices (or nodes), and E is
a set of ordered pairs of different vertices, called directed
edges. The vertices in the set Nvi = {vj |(vj , vi ) ∈ E} are
said to be neighbors of vertex vi . A subgraph of G is a graph
H = {V̄, Ē}, with V̄ ⊆ V and Ē ⊆ E (where all edges in Ē
are between vertices in V̄).
A path P from vertex vi0 to vertex vit is a sequence of
vertices vi0 vi1 · · ·vit such that (vij , vij+1 ) ∈ E for 0 ≤ j ≤
t − 1. The nonnegative integer t is the length of the path. We

will call a graph disconnected if there exists at least one pair
of vertices vi , vj ∈ V such that there is no path from vj to
vi . The connectivity of the graph is defined as the smallest
number of vertices that must be removed to disconnect the
graph, and is denoted by κ. A set of paths P1 , P2 , . . . , Pr are
vertex disjoint if no vertex appears in more than one path.
Given two subsets V1 , V2 ⊂ V, an r-linking from V1 to V2 is
a set of r vertex disjoint paths, each with start vertex in V1
and end vertex in V2 . Note that if V1 and V2 are not disjoint,
we will take their common vertices to be vertex disjoint paths
between V1 and V2 of length zero. The following classical
result will play a role in our derivations (e.g., see [16]).
Lemma 1: Let G = {V, E} have connectivity κ, and let
V1 and V2 be subsets of V, each of size at least κ. Then
there is a κ-linking from V1 to V2 (and vice versa).
III. T HE W IRELESS C ONTROL N ETWORK
Consider a plant of the form
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] + Bu[k]
y[k] = Cx[k],

(1)

with A ∈ Rn×n , B ∈  Rn×m and C ∈ Rp×n
′ . The
output vector y[k] = y1 [k] y2 [k] . . . yp [k] contains measurements of the plant state vector x[k] provided
by the sensors s1 , . .. , sp . The input vector u[k] =

′
u1 [k] u2 [k] . . . um [k] corresponds to the signals applied to the plant by actuators a1 , . . . , am .
The plant is to be controlled using a wireless network
consisting of a set of nodes that interact with each other and
with the sensors and actuators installed on the plant. Each
node in the network is equipped with a radio transceiver
along with (limited) memory and computational capabilities.1 Similarly, each sensor and actuator on the plant
contains a radio transceiver, allowing them to communicate
with neighboring nodes. The wireless network is described
by a graph G = {V, E}, where V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vN } is
the set of N nodes and E ⊆ V × V represents the radio
connectivity (communication topology) in the network (i.e.,
edge (vj , vi ) ∈ E if node vi can receive information directly
from node vj ). In addition, we define VS ⊂ V as the set of
nodes that can receive information directly from at least one
sensor, and VA ⊂ V as the set of nodes whose transmissions
can be heard by at least one actuator. We will refer to VS as
the source nodes in the network. In this paper, we will also
assume that there are some malicious nodes in the network,
given by the set F ⊂ V. These malicious nodes will transmit
false values (perhaps by conspiring with each other) in an
attempt to damage the system in some way. Note that the set
F is unknown a priori.
In our development, we will find it convenient to consider
a new graph Ḡ that captures how the plant outputs enter
into the wireless control network. This graph is obtained by
taking the graph of the network G and adding p new vertices
1 We will model these resource constraints by limiting the state maintained
by each node to be a scalar. As discussed in [6], the control scheme can
also be applied to cases where nodes are allowed to maintain state vectors.

S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sp }, corresponding to the sensors on the
plant. Define the edge set


sl ∈ S, vj ∈ VS ,
EI =
(sl , vj )
.
sl ’s value is available to node vj
We then obtain Ḡ = {V ∪ S, E ∪ EI }.
The proposed control scheme (introduced in [6], [17])
consists of having each node in the network update its value
to be a linear combination of its previous value and the
values of its neighbors. In addition, each source node will
include a linear combination of the sensor measurements
(i.e., plant outputs) that it receives at each time-step. Finally,
the malicious nodes will update their values arbitrarily at
each time-step. Mathematically, if we let zi [k] denote node
vi ’s value at time-step k, we obtain the update equations:2
zi [k + 1] =

P
wii zi [k] + vj ∈Nv wij zj [k]


i
P



+ sj ∈Nv hij yj [k]


i

 wii zi [k] + P
wij zj [k]
v
j ∈Nvi
P
+ sj ∈Nv hij yj [k] + fi [k]


i
P



w
z
[k]
+
wij zj [k] + fi [k]
ii
i

v
∈N
j
v

i

 wii zi [k] + P
vj ∈Nv wij zj [k]
i

(2)
if vi ∈ VS \ F ,
if vi ∈ VS ∩ F ,
if vi ∈ F \ VS ,
if vi ∈
/ VS ∪ F .

The scalars wij and hij specify the linear combinations
that are computed by each node in the network. The scalar
fi [k] is an additive error3 committed by node vi at timestep k if it is malicious. If we let F = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vj|F| }
denote the set of malicious nodes, and aggregate the values
transmitted
 by all nodes at time-step
′ k into the value vector
z[k] = z1 [k] z2 [k] · · · zN [k] , the transmission strategy for the entire system can be represented as
z[k + 1] = Wz[k] + Hy[k]

+ ej1
|

ej2

···
{z

EF





ej|F| 
}
|



 y[k]
= Wz[k] + H EF
,
| {z } f [k]
| {z }
BF


fj1 [k]
fj2 [k]
..
.







fj|F| [k]
{z }

(3)

f [k]

v[k]

for all k ∈ N. In the above equation, the (i, j) entry of W
satisfies wij = 0 if vj ∈
/ Nvi , and the (i, j) entry of H
satisfies hij = 0 if sj ∈
/ Nvi . We assume that z[0] (i.e., the
initial state of the wireless control network) is known to the
IDS. Recall that the symbol ei denotes a vector with a single
1 in the i–th position and zeros elsewhere.
At each actuator l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, we apply the input
ul [k] = gl z[k], where gl is a vector that specifies a linear
2 The

neighborhood Nv of a vertex v is with respect to the graph Ḡ.
model allows a malicious node to update and transmit an arbitrary
value by choosing the error term fi [k] appropriately. It also captures the
scenario where multiple malicious nodes update their values in a coordinated
manner. We assume that malicious nodes cannot send conflicting values to
different neighbors, due to the broadcast nature of the communications.
3 This

combination of the values transmitted by the nodes VA that
are near that actuator.4 The update strategy for the network
can therefore be represented as
z[k + 1] = Wz[k] + Hy[k] + EF f [k]
u[k] = Gz[k],
where the matrices W ∈ RN ×N , H ∈ RN ×p and G ∈
Rm×N have sparsity constraints determined by the underlying network topology. When there are no malicious nodes
(i.e., F = ∅), the overall closed loop system evolves as:

 




x[k + 1]
A BG
x[k]
x[k]
=
, Â
.
z[k + 1]
HC W
z[k]
z[k]
Matrix Â is structured, in that certain entries are forced to
be zero (corresponding to the topology of the wireless control
network). Let Ψs denote the set of all tuples (W, H, G) that
satisfy the required sparsity patterns and that cause the matrix
Â to have all its eigenvalues inside the open unit circle. In
[6], [17], a numerical procedure was provided to find an
element of Ψs (if one exists).
In this paper, we consider the problem of data collection
and analysis in this network for the purpose of identifying
malicious behavior by a nonempty subset F of nodes.
Specifically, we will describe the design of an Intrusion
Detection System,5 whose task is to collect data from the
network in order to (a) recover the plant outputs6 y[k] and
(b) detect and isolate anomalous behavior in the wireless
control network. Clearly, one trivial option would be for
the IDS to simply listen to the transmissions of every node
and sensor in the network, and double-check that all nodes
are indeed computing the proper linear combinations at
each time-step. However, this is not a satisfactory solution,
since the entire point of the wireless control network is
to avoid the communication infrastructure required for a
centralized solution of this kind. Instead, we would like a
way to identify the malicious nodes in the network and
obtain the plant outputs by viewing the transmissions of
just a subset T ⊂ V of the nodes. Perhaps surprisingly, we
will show that this is possible with an appropriate choice
of the set T (provided that the network topology satisfies
certain conditions), even though the transmissions of the
nodes have been designed specifically with the goal of plant
stabilization in mind. In other words, the above design for the
wireless control network simultaneously achieves the dual
objectives of stabilizing the plant and providing the IDS
with enough information to diagnose failures and malicious
4 In this work, we do not consider the possibility of malicious actuators
that apply arbitrary inputs to the system. Such behavior can potentially be
identified by using the outputs of the plant y[k] and applying appropriate
fault-diagnosis techniques, as described below.
5 We assume that this is a trusted entity, with sufficient computational and
storage capabilities to analyze the data that it receives from the network.
6 This information can be used by the IDS for tasks such as diagnosing
faults that occur within the plant (e.g., using the techniques described in
[18]). Since this is a rather general problem, we will not delve into the
details of how the IDS uses the outputs y[k] further in this paper, and
instead, will concentrate on ensuring that the IDS can obtain these outputs,
in addition to identifying malicious nodes in the control network.

behavior. Broadly speaking, our analysis will reveal that if
the connectivity of the wireless control network is at least
p + 2f , and if each sensor measurement is heard by at least
p+2f nodes, then the IDS can deduce the above information
from the transmissions of any p + 2f nodes in the network,
as long as there are no more than f malicious nodes during
any D contiguous time-steps (where D is an integer that we
will characterize later).
Remark 1: In this work, we will not consider a probabilistic drop model for the channels between nodes; the possibility of a large number of (accidental) packet losses incurred
by such a model complicates the task of isolating malicious
behavior, and future research will be devoted to addressing
this more general scenario. However, our model does capture
the case where there is a limited (bounded) number of packetdropping channels in any set of D contiguous time-steps.
Specifically, note that a dropped packet from node vj to
vi can be modeled as “malicious” behavior by node vi ,
where the additive error fi [k] is selected to cancel out the
contribution of zj [k] in vi ’s update. Thus, one can effectively
trade an actual malicious node for a dropped packet in our
analysis, as long as the total number of actual malicious
nodes and dropped packets in any set of D contiguous timesteps is less than or equal to f .
IV. A NALYSIS A LGORITHM FOR THE I NTRUSION
D ETECTION S YSTEM
For any set T ⊂ V, denote the vector of transmissions of
the nodes in that set at time-step k by t[k]. We can write
t[k] = Tz[k] ,

(4)

where T is a |T | × N matrix with a single 1 in each row
capturing the positions of the vector z[k] that are in the set T ,
and zeros elsewhere. In this section, we provide a procedure
for the IDS to use to parse the values t[k], k ∈ N, in order
to recover the plant outputs y[k], and identify anomalous
behavior by any nodes in the network.
In our development, we will find it useful to consider
a slightly more general version of the system model (3).
For any subset Q = {vq1 , vq2 ,. . . , vq|Q| } ⊂ V of nodes, let
EQ = eq1 eq2 · · · eq|Q| , and define BQ = H EQ
(where H is the matrix from (3) specifying the linear
combinations of the plant outputs that are used by the source
nodes). Note that BQ has p + |Q| columns. The values seen
by the IDS over L + 1 time-steps (for some nonnegative
integer L) for the system
z[k + 1] = Wz[k] + BQ v[k]
t[k] = Tz[k]

(5)

where

MQ
L



0
TBQ
TWBQ
..
.




,


TWL−1 BQ

0
0
TBQ
..
.

···
···
···
..
.

0
0
0
..
.

TWL−2 BQ

···

TBQ






. (7)



When L = N − 1, ΘL is the observability matrix for
the pair (W, T), and we will call MQ
L the input matrix
corresponding to the set Q.
The following theorem shows that the IDS can recover
the desired quantities from the transmissions of nodes in
T , provided that a certain algebraic condition holds. We
will later relate this algebraic condition to conditions on the
network topology and choices of the monitored nodes T .
Theorem 1: Suppose that there exists an integer D such
that, for all possible sets Q of 2f nodes, the matrix MQ
D
satisfies


Q
rank MQ
.
(8)
D = p + |Q| + rank MD−1

Then, as long as there are no more than f malicious nodes in
the network during any set of D contiguous time-steps, the
IDS can uniquely recover the plant outputs y[k] and identify
all of the malicious nodes with a delay of D time-steps,
based on the transmissions of the nodes in T .
Before proceeding with the proof of the above theorem,
we provide a more detailed explanation of condition (8).
Specifically, note from (7) that for anyh set Q,ithe last (L−1)
0
Q
block-columns of MQ
L have the form ML−1 , and thus have

rank equal to the rank of MQ
L−1 . Condition (8) is therefore
equivalent to saying that the first p + |Q| columns of MQ
D
must be linearly independent of each other, and of all other
columns in MQ
D . With this interpretation in hand, we are
now ready to continue with the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: [Theorem 1] Consider time-steps k =
0, 1, . . . , D, and suppose that the malicious nodes during this
period are a subset of the set F = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjf }. From
(3), (4) and (6), the values seen by the IDS over these timesteps are given by
(9)
t[0 : D] = ΘD z[0] + MF
D v[0 : D − 1] ,
 ′

′
where v[k] = y [k] f ′ [k] . Note that the IDS knows the
quantities t[0 : D] and ΘD z[0], but it does not know the set
F or the values v[0 : D − 1]. The IDS will try to identify
these unknown parameters based on the known quantities.
Let F1 , F2 , . . . , F(N ) ⊂ V denote all possible sets of
f

are given by

 



t[k]
T
v[k]
 t[k + 1]   TW 
 v[k + 1] 
 




 t[k + 2]   TW2 
Q  v[k + 2] 

=
 z[k] + ML 
, (6)
  .. 



..
..

  . 


.
.
t[k + L]
TWL
v[k + L − 1]
|
{z
} | {z }
|
{z
}
t[k:k+L]

ΘL

v[k:k+L−1]

F N
(f )
F2
1
MF
,
M
,
.
.
.
,
M
D
D
D

f nodes, and let
denote the input
matrices corresponding to these sets. With these matrices in
hand, suppose that the IDS finds the first j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N
f }
such that the vector t[0 : D]−ΘD z[0] is in the column space
F
of the matrix MDj . This means that the IDS can find a vector
v̄[0 : D − 1] such that
F

MDj v̄[0 : D − 1] = t[0 : D] − ΘD z[0].

The vector v̄[0 : D − 1] is the IDS’s estimate
of the value

′ of
v[0 : D − 1] (note that the value v̄[k] = ȳ′ [k] f̄ ′ [k] contains estimates of the plant outputs and the malicious errors
at time-step k). Substituting (9) into the above expression
and rearranging, we have
F

j
MF
D v[0 : D − 1] − MD v̄[0 : D − 1] = 0 .

Let {F , Fj } denote the set that is obtained by concatenating
sets F and Fj (i.e., it is the union of the two sets, with
duplications allowed). Exploiting the form of matrix MQ
D
shown in (7), the above expression can be written as



0
···
0
ṽ[0]
 TB{F ,Fj }
  ṽ[1] 
···
0



 TWB{F ,Fj }
  ṽ[2] 
·
·
·
0
=0





..
..
..
..




.
.
.
.
D−1
ṽ[D − 1]
TW
B{F ,Fj } · · · TB{F ,Fj }
{z
}
|
{F,Fj }

MD


where B{F ,Fj } = H


EF EFj and


y[k] − ȳ[k]
 .
ṽ[k] = 
f [k]
−f̄[k]
F ∪F

(10)

Now consider the matrix MD j . Since F ∪ Fj has at
most 2f nodes, equation (8) in the statement of the theorem
indicates that the first p + |F ∪ Fj | columns of the matrix
F ∪F
MD j are linearly independent of each other, and of all
other columns of the matrix. Now, note that the matrix
{F ,F }
F ∪F
MD j is obtained from matrix MD j simply by duplicating certain columns (namely, the columns corresponding
to nodes that appear in both F and Fj ). Consider a node
vl ∈ F . If vl ∈
/ Fj , then the column corresponding to vl
{F ,F }
within the first p + 2f columns of MD j will be linearly
{F ,F }
independent of all other columns in MD j (since this
column will also appear in the first p + |F ∪ Fj | columns of
F ∪F
MD j ). This means that equation (10) can be satisfied only
if fl [0] = 0. On the other hand, if fl [0] 6= 0, the only way for
equation (10) to be satisfied is if vl ∈ Fj and f¯l [0] = fl [0]. In
other words, if equation (8) is satisfied, any malicious node
that commits an error during the first time-step will appear
in set Fj , and its additive error can be found by the IDS.
{F ,F }
Next, note from (8) that the first p columns of MD j
will be linearly independent of each other and of all other
columns in that matrix (since these columns also appear in
F ∪F
{F ,F }
MD j and are not duplicated in MD j ). This means that
the only way for equation (10) to be satisfied is if ȳ[0] =
y[0]. Thus, the IDS has also recovered the outputs of the
plant that were injected into the network at time-step k = 0.
At this point, the IDS knows y[0] and the identities of
those nodes in F that committed errors during time-step 0,
along with the exact values of their additive errors. The IDS
can then use (3) to obtain the transmitted values of all nodes
at time-step k = 1 as
z[1] = Wz[0] + Hy[0] + BFj f̄ [0] .

Now, using the identity
t[1 : D + 1] = ΘD z[1] + MF
D v[1 : D] ,
the IDS can repeat the above process to find the values of
y[1] along with the identities of the nodes that are malicious
during time-step k = 1. By repeating the above procedure
for all positive values of k, the IDS can obtain the identities
of all malicious nodes and the errors that they commit, along
with the source streams y[k] for all k, simply by listening
to the transmissions of the nodes in T .
Remark 2: It is worth noting that the decoding procedure
specified in the above proof requires the testing of up to N
f
matrices (in the worst case) in order to locate the malicious
nodes. If one assumes that the set of malicious nodes does
not change over time, then at time-step k, the IDS can
restrict its search to only those sets Fj that contain all of the
malicious nodes from time-steps less than k. This reduces
the computational burden on the IDS in subsequent timesteps. However, if we allow the IDS to repeat the search for
malicious nodes at each time-step, this analysis procedure
is also able to tolerate cases where the set of malicious
nodes changes over time (with the only constraint being that
no more than f nodes are malicious during any set of D
contiguous time-steps). The development of a more efficient
method to parse the transmissions of the monitored nodes is
an important venue for future research.
V. N ETWORK T OPOLOGY C ONDITIONS FOR
M ISBEHAVIOR I DENTIFICATION AND DATA R ECOVERY
Theorem 1 provides a decoding procedure for the IDS
provided that condition (8) is true. In this section, we will
use results from the theory of dynamic system inversion and
structured linear systems to relate this condition to conditions
on the network topology.
A. System Inversion
Consider the wireless control network given by equations
(3) and (4). The quantities y[k] and f [k] in (3) are unknown
to the IDS, and so linear systems of this type are termed
linear systems with unknown inputs7 in the control literature
(e.g., see [19]). For such systems, it is often of interest
to “invert” the system in order to reconstruct some or all
of the unknown inputs, and this problem has been studied
under the moniker of dynamic system inversion. We will
now summarize some pertinent results from the literature
on system inversion, and apply them to the problem of
detecting and identifying malicious nodes in the wireless
control network.
For any set Q ⊆ V, the output of the linear system (5) over
L + 1 time-steps (for some nonnegative integer L) is given
by (6). Alternatively, we can consider the transfer function
P(z) = T (zI − W)

−1

BQ ,

which is a |T | × (p + |Q|) matrix of rational functions of z.
7 In our case, the set F (and thus the matrix B ) is also unknown to
F
the IDS, so the system given by (3) and (4) is more general than the linear
systems with unknown inputs commonly considered in the literature.

Definition 1: The system (5) is said to have an L-delay
b
inverse if there exists a system with transfer function P(z)
−L
b
such that P(z)P(z) = z Ip+|Q| . The system is invertible if
it has an L-delay inverse for some finite L. The least integer
L for which an L-delay inverse exists is called the inherent
delay of the system.
In order for the system to be invertible, its transfer function
must have rank p + |Q| over the field of rational functions in
z. The following result follows directly from [19] and [20]
(which studied the problem of dynamic system inversion)
and provides a test for invertibility in terms of the system
matrices W, BQ and T.
Theorem 2 ([19], [20]): For any nonnegative integer L,
Q
rank(MQ
L ) ≤ p + |Q| + rank(ML−1 )

(11)

with equality if and only if the system has an L-delay inverse
Q
(note that rank(M−1
) is defined to be zero). If the system is
invertible, its inherent delay will not exceed L = N − p −
|Q| + 1.
Note that condition (11) means that the first p + |Q|
columns of MQ
L must be linearly independent of each other,
and of all other columns in MQ
L . Taking Q to be any set
of 2f nodes, this is precisely the condition that is required
for us to detect and identify malicious nodes (as specified in
equation (8) in Theorem 1). In other words, the problem of
identifying malicious nodes in the wireless control network
can be viewed as a problem of linear system inversion. Thus
the task is now to find conditions on the network topology
and a set of nodes T that will ensure that the linear system
specified by the matrices (W, BQ , T) is invertible for every
choice Q ⊂ V of 2f nodes. To solve this problem, we will
first use the theory of linear structured systems to obtain a
graph-theoretic characterization of invertibility.
B. Structured Systems
A linear system of the form (5) is said to be structured if
each entry of the matrices W, BQ and T is either a fixed
zero or an independent free parameter [21]. Interestingly,
such systems have certain properties that can be inferred
purely from the zero/nonzero structure of the system matrices; these properties will hold for almost any choice of
free parameters (i.e., the set of parameters for which the
property does not hold has Lebesgue measure zero [21]),
and thus these properties are called generic. Of particular
relevance to this paper is the generic normal rank of the
transfer function matrix of a structured system, which is the
maximum rank (over the field of rational functions in z) of
the transfer function matrix over all possible choices of free
parameters.
To analyze structural properties of linear systems of the
form (5), one associates a graph H with the structured set
(W, BQ , T) as follows. The vertex set of H is given by
V ∪ I ∪ O, where V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vN } is the set of state
vertices, I = {i1 , i2 , . . . , ip+|Q| } is the set of input vertices,
and O = {o1 , o2 , . . . , o|T | } is the set of output vertices. The
edge set of H is given by Evv ∪ Eiv ∪ Evo , where Evv =
{(vj , vl ) | Wlj 6= 0}, Eiv = {(ij , vl ) | BQ,lj 6= 0}, and

Evo = {(vj , ol ) | Tlj 6= 0} (where Wlj indicates entry
(l, j) of matrix W, and so forth). The following theorem
characterizes the generic normal rank of the transfer function
of a structured linear system in terms of the graph H.
Theorem 3 ([21], [22]): Let the graph of a structured
linear system be given by H. Then the generic normal rank
of the transfer function of the system is equal to the maximal
size of a linking in H from I to O.
The above result says that if the graph of the structured
system (5) has p + |Q| vertex disjoint paths from the
inputs to the outputs, then for almost any choice of free
parameters in W, BQ and T, the transfer function matrix
T(zI − W)−1 BQ will have full column rank. Based on
Theorem 2, this will mean that the first p + |Q| columns
of the matrix MQ
N −p−|Q|+1 will be linearly independent of
all other columns in MQ
N −p−|Q|+1 .
We now have a graph-theoretic characterization of the
invertibility of linear structured systems, and are in place to
apply this to the problem of identifying malicious behavior
and recovering the plant outputs in the wireless control
network.
C. Topological Conditions for Identifying Malicious Nodes
From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the IDS can identify
up to f malicious nodes if the linear system given by the
tuple (W, BQ , T) is invertible for every set Q ⊂ V of
up to 2f nodes. To verify that this property holds, note
that for any given set Q, the tuple (W, BQ , T) essentially
defines a structured linear system, with the only exception
being that
entries in the matrices EQ (where
 the nonzero

BQ = H EQ ) and T are taken to be “1”, rather than
free parameters. However, this is of no consequence, since
each nonzero entry in those matrices appears in a row and
column by itself, and thus can essentially be “scaled” to a
free parameter by an appropriate redefinition of the inputs
and outputs (e.g., see [23]). Thus, we can proceed with
applying the above results on structured system theory to the
tuple (W, BQ , T), which brings us to the following result.
Theorem 4: Let Ḡ = {V ∪ S, E ∪ EI } denote the graph of
the wireless control network G augmented with the sensor
vertices S and the corresponding edges. Let T ⊂ V denote
the set of monitored nodes. Suppose that for every possible
set Q ⊂ V of 2f nodes, the graph Ḡ contains a (p + 2f )–
linking from S ∪ Q to T . Then, for almost any element
(W, H, G) ∈ Ψs (if it is nonempty), there exists an integer
D ≤ N −p−2f +1 such that the IDS can recover the outputs
of the plant and identify all malicious nodes with a delay of
at most D time-steps, as long as there are no more than f
malicious nodes in any set of D contiguous time-steps.
Proof: For any set Q ⊂ V of 2f nodes, consider the
graph8 HQ associated with the structured set (W, BQ , T).
To obtain this graph, start by taking the graph of the network
G (which captures the vertices and interconnections in the
matrix W). To this graph, add p+ 2f input vertices (denoted
8 The notation H
Q is used to denote the fact that this graph is associated
with the structured set (W, BQ , T), for a particular set Q of 2f nodes.

by I) which will connect to the nodes in the graph according
to the structure of the input matrix BQ . Specifically, p of
these input vertices correspond to the plant sensors S (which
produce y[k]), and each of these has outgoing edges to the
nodes in VS (specified by the structure of matrix H). The
other 2f input vertices each have a single outgoing edge to
a node in Q (corresponding to the single 1 in each column
of EQ ). Next, add |T | output vertices (denoted by the set
O), and place a single edge from each node in the set T to
a node in O, corresponding to the single nonzero entry in
each row of the matrix T. Furthermore, add a self loop to
every state vertex corresponding to the nonzero entries on
the diagonal of the matrix W.
From the statement of the theorem, note that graph Ḡ
contains a linking of size p + 2f from S ∪ Q to T , for any
set Q of 2f nodes. This linking also exists in the graph HQ ,
since Ḡ is a subgraph of HQ .9 This linking can be extended
to a linking from the entire set I to T in HQ simply by
including the edges from the set I \ S to the set Q. Finally,
this linking can be further extended to a linking from I to O
simply by including the edges from each vertex in T to the
corresponding output vertex in O. From Theorem 3, we see
that the system (W, BQ , T) will be invertible for almost
any choice of matrices W and H (subject to the required
sparsity patterns). This genericness implies that invertibility
will hold simultaneously for all of the sets (W, BQ , T) for
every set Q of 2f nodes with almost any choice of free
parameters in the matrices W and H. From Theorem 2,
the first p + |Q| columns of the matrix MQ
N −p−2f +1 will be
linearly independent of each other and of all other columns in
MQ
N −p−2f +1 . Thus, condition (8) in Theorem 1 is satisfied,
and the IDS can uniquely determine the identities of the
malicious nodes, as well as the values of the plant outputs,
based on the transmissions of the nodes in T , with a delay
of at most N − p − 2f + 1 time-steps.
Finally, we show that there is a tuple (W, H, G) in the set
Ψs (which contains all stabilizing structured matrices for the
plant and is assumed to be nonempty) that allows the IDS to
recover the desired information. This is easily done by noting
that the set of matrices for which the system is stable has
nonzero measure in the space Rr (where r is the number of
free parameters in the matrices W and H). More precisely, if
we let λ ∈ Rr denote a numerical vector of free parameters
in W and H that produces stability (e.g., obtained from the
design procedure in [6], [17]), the closed loop system will
remain stable for any parameter vectors λ∗ satisfying the
component-wise inequalities λ − ǫ1 ≤ λ∗ ≤ λ + ǫ1, for
sufficiently small ǫ > 0; this is because the eigenvalues of a
matrix vary continuously with the parameters in that matrix.
Thus, the set of parameters for which the system is stable has
measure at least (2ǫ)r > 0, whereas the set of parameters for
which the system is not invertible has measure zero. Thus,
for almost any tuple (W, H, G) ∈ Ψs , the system is stable
and allows the IDS to recover the plant outputs and identify
9 Specifically, it is the graph obtained by dropping the output vertices and
the 2f input vertices connecting to the set Q in HQ .

malicious behavior.
Theorem 4 characterizes the set of nodes T that the IDS
should observe in order to achieve its objectives. Specifically,
T should be sufficiently well connected to the rest of the
network (i.e., there should be enough vertex disjoint paths
from the other nodes in the network to the nodes in T ).
However, the fact that the theorem is framed in terms of all
possible sets Q of 2f nodes makes it somewhat unwieldy.
One can come up with a more compact condition when the
entire network is sufficiently well connected, as follows.
Corollary 1: Suppose that the network G has connectivity
at least p + 2f , and that each sensor in S connects to at least
p + 2f source nodes. Let T ⊆ V be any set of at least p + 2f
nodes. Then, for almost any element (W, H, G) ∈ Ψs (if it
is nonempty), there exists an integer D ≤ N − p − 2f + 1
such that the IDS can recover the outputs of the plant and
identify all malicious nodes with a delay of D time-steps, as
long as there are no more than f malicious nodes in any set
of D contiguous time-steps.
Proof: Since the network has connectivity p + 2f ,
Lemma 1 shows that for any set Q of 2f nodes, there is
a linking of size p + 2f from the set VS ∪ Q to T (since
|VS | ≥ p + 2f ). Since each sensor in S connects to at least
p + 2f source nodes, each sensor will connect to at least p
nodes in the set VS \ Q. By Hall’s Theorem (e.g., see [16]),
there is a linking of size p from S to VS \ Q (this is also
called a matching). Thus, the graph Ḡ = {V ∪ S, E ∪ EI }
contains a linking of size p + 2f from S ∪ Q to T for any
set Q of 2f nodes. The conditions required for Theorem 4
are thus satisfied, from which the result follows.
Note that the above corollary indicates that in networks
with connectivity p + 2f or higher, any set of p + 2f
nodes can be chosen to be observed by the IDS in order
to recover the desired information about the system. For
example, consider the wireless control network shown in
Fig. 1. The source nodes VS = {v1 , v2 , v3 } have access to the
plant’s (scalar) output y[k] at each time-step, and the plant’s
actuator applies a linear combination of the transmissions
of the nodes from the set VA = {v7 , v8 , v9 }. Note that the
connectivity of the network is κ = 3, and since there is a
single sensor on the plant (p = 1) that connects to three
nodes, Corollary 1 indicates that the IDS can detect and
identify up to f = ⌊ κ−p
2 ⌋ = 1 malicious node, simply by
monitoring the transmissions of any p + 2f nodes (e.g., the
set T = {v3 , v6 , v9 }). We will forgo a numerical example of
the analysis procedure here in the interest of space, but the
interested reader is directed to [17] for more details.
VI. R EMOVING M ALICIOUS N ODES
There are various courses of action that can be taken
once the IDS detects and identifies a set of malicious nodes.
The most direct (and drastic) action would be to shut down
the plant and dispatch appropriate personnel to physically
remove the malicious nodes from the network and investigate
the source of the attacks. This is clearly an option of
last resort, as plant shut-downs may be expensive, timeconsuming, and difficult to perform. An online method to

remove the malicious nodes would be more desirable, so
that the plant can continue to operate. We will now briefly
describe one means of achieving this.
First, once the IDS identifies a set of malicious nodes,
it broadcasts a message containing the identities of all
malicious nodes to all of the nodes in the network. There
are various low-overhead schemes for fault-tolerant broadcast
in wireless networks (e.g., see [24]) that can be used to
guarantee that each node receives the correct message. After
this is done, the correct nodes in the system simply ignore
the transmissions of the exposed malicious nodes. However,
in order to avoid affecting the stability of the closed loop
system, the computations undertaken by the malicious nodes
must be migrated to other nodes in the network. This can be
done by following the protocol described in the companion
paper [6] for dealing with crash-failures (i.e., nodes that
simply drop out of the network). In this protocol, one of the
failed node’s neighbors becomes a virtual node and assumes
the role of calculating the failed node’s linear combinations
at each time-step. All other neighbors of the failed node
increase their transmission ranges so that the virtual node will
receive the same information at each time-step as the failed
node did. By ignoring the malicious nodes (i.e., treating them
as crash-failures) and applying the above protocol, the plant
can continue to operate; note that this scheme has its limits,
since nodes can only increase their transmission ranges up
to a certain point, and expend greater energy in doing so.
However, it provides a way for the system to gracefully
degrade (and self-heal) under malicious attacks until the
afflicted nodes are repaired.
VII. S UMMARY
We considered the problem of identifying malicious behavior in a wireless control network. Under nominal conditions, each node in the network transmits (at each timestep) a linear combination of the values in its immediate
neighborhood. We showed in a companion paper that the
linear combination for each node can be chosen so that
the transmissions of nodes closest to the actuators of the
plant will be stabilizing. In this paper, we showed how to
construct a IDS that observes the transmissions of just a
subset of the nodes in the network, and uses that information
to obtain the actual plant outputs, along with the identities
of any malicious nodes. In particular, we showed that if the
connectivity of the network is at least p + 2f , and each
output of the plant is heard by at least p + 2f nodes, then
the IDS can recover the desired information by listening to
the transmissions of any p + 2f nodes in the network.
There are a variety of avenues for future research.
First,

our approach requires the IDS to consider up to N
matrices
f
in order to locate the malicious nodes; a more efficient
scheme for parsing the observed transmissions would reduce
the computational burden on the IDS. Second, an extension
of these results to the case where the channels in the
network drop packets in a probabilistic manner would allow
our scheme to be applied in more general (i.e., unreliable)
networks.
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